Libya Strategic Foresight Analysis
Teemu Kilpeläinen
Majuri Teemu Kilpeläinen palvelee tällä hetkellä apulaisosastopäällikkönä Panssariprikaatin Esikunnassa. Hän siirtyy Ilmavoimien Esikuntaan ilmatorjuntapäällikön tehtävään 1.9.2015. Hän opiskeli Yhdysvaltain Joint Forces Staff College:ssa keväällä ja alkukesällä 2015. Kurssin opetus painottui operaatiotaitoon ja strategiaan.
Kaksitoista viikkoa kestäneen kurssin tarkoituksena oli antaa kurssilaiselle valmiuksia ymmärtää, suunnitella ja osallistua monikansallisiin operaatioihin Yhdysvaltojen lähtökohdista. Kurssilla opiskeli yhteensä 240 upseeria. Euroopasta oppilaita oli Suomen lisäksi Norjasta ja Saksasta. Artikkeli on majuri Teemu Kilpeläisen johtaman työryhmän laatima kirjoitus Strategic Foresight – valinnaisaineen kurssilta. Työryhmän kolme muuta jäsentä olivat yhdysvaltalaiset everstiluutnantit Judd Mahfouz ja Randy Oakland sekä majuri David Newell.
(Toim.huom. Artikkeli on strategiaopintoihin liittyvä, majuri Kilpeläisen johtaman työryhmän opinnäytetyö ja se on kirjoitettu Yhdysvaltojen strategisista lähtökohdista. Artikkeli julkaistaan tekijöiden toivomuksesta kokonaisuudessaan englanniksi, koska suomen kielelle käännettynä sen alkuperäinen merkitys ja sisältö muuttuvat.)
Introduction
Current imbalance and violence after Muammar Gaddafi in Libya has proved that United States hadn’t proper strategic foresight during recent years. H.L. Menkin once noted that “For every complex problem there is an answer that is clear, simple, and wrong” (Menkin). This quote is applicable to the complex problem of attempting to determine the strategic foresight in Libya. Trying to use simple methods to divine that foresight would incorrect. It is impossible to predict the future, especially on the complex and grand scale of geo-political relationship, but there are ways to go about trying to envision it. Studying facts, using different kind of strategic foresight tools and professional speculation about Libya can help in predicting the future. Focusing on those same facts, results and speculations can also aid in avoiding bias and gross misunderstanding in the future. Understanding Libya’s current, recent and coming actions will help U.S. to create proper strategic foresight and make use of it successfully.
U.S. must conserve resources and prioritize its interest globally. In the National Security Strategy 2015 preface it is being said: “As powerful as we are and will remain, our resources and influence are not infinite. And in a complex world, many of the security problems we face do not lend themselves to quick and easy fixes. The United States will always defend our interests and uphold our commitments to allies and partners. But, we have to make hard choices among many competing priorities, and we must always resist the over-reach that comes when we make decisions based upon fear. Moreover, we must recognize that a smart national security strategy does not rely solely on military power. Indeed, in the long-term, our efforts to work with other countries to counter the ideology and root causes of violent extremism will be more important than our capacity to remove terrorists from the battlefield.”
The purpose of this paper is view Libya’s possible future trends and give recommendations U.S. strategic level policy-makers to make correct decision instead of just guessing them. Complex Libya problem will be surveyed through U.S. strategic interests, history, Elements and Behavior Over Time (BOT), the Casual Loop Diagram (CLD), future trends, alternate futures, social change theory and anticipatory management diagram analysis. Finally this paper will provide some strategic recommendations and conclusion.
U.S. strategic interest
In late 2014, the Congressional Research Service analyzed the Libyan political and security situation and noted U.S. strategic interests in Libya that primarily focused on regional stability, domestic security, and the safety of U.S. and allied personnel. The CRS report cited U.S. State Department and Administration assertions that a deteriorated security situation in eastern and southwestern regions had created a significant terrorist safe-haven for several Islamist organizations. In particular, it identified a nexus between these under governed spaces and foreign-fighter flow into Syria (Blanchard 2014, 1). More recently however, concerns are growing over the reverse flow of militants, specifically ISIL, out of Syrian strongholds focused on expanding their permanent foothold in Libya (Abi-Habib and Nissenbaum 2015).
A recently released joint statement by several western nations, to include the United States, further expounded upon shared interest stating, a “strong commitment to the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and national unity of Libya, and to ensuring that Libyan economic, financial, and energy resources are used for the benefit of all Libyan people (State 2015).” Unfortunately, confounding Western efforts to achieve these stated goals and stem the potential for malign effects emanating from Libya is the lack of a truly reliable Libyan government with which to partner. Due to a failed security situation in the capital, the internationally recognized government of Libya (the Counsel of Representatives) remains in exile in the eastern city of Tobruk with little leverage over many of the instruments of government. Meanwhile, in and around Tripoli armed groups loyal to the exiled government and those of their political rivals the General National Council continue to vie for control of critical infrastructure with little regard for collateral damage thereby raising the threat of humanitarian
Background
Arab tribes are divided in their alignments with Operation Dawn and Operation Dignity. Here, by Arab tribes, we refer to tribes with Arab or a mixed Arab-Berber ethnicity, which encompass Libya’s main tribes that are not Amazigh, Tuareg, or Toubou. Note that any alliances described are in general, and there may be exceptions at a sub-tribe or familial level. Arab tribe strength varies considerably; for example, the Warfallah are estimated to number over one million while the Qadhadhfa are estimated around 100,000 (Bell and Witter, Institute for the Study of War, September 2011). Tribal alignment with either Dawn or Dignity does not always mean political or ideological support, as shown by the Tuareg’s pragmatic relationship with Dawn of Libya (see previous post). As another example, the Obeidat and Baraasa tribes support Dignity, but are unwilling to support any alternative “political or military ambitions,” lest they lose their “traditional control and influence over the military” (Abdallah, Al-Ahram, May 29, 2014). We also have Toubou support pledged to the Council of Representatives and Operation Dignity, which occurs only after their Arab rivals’ pledge of support for Operation Dawn. This shows again, as suggested previously, that Libyan tribalism is flexible, and that allegiances fluctuate according to circumstances and pragmatic opportunities. Yet, even this opportunism should not be overstated, as, religious (or refusal of some extremist positions, such as Salafism), political, or city/regional loyalties may override larger tribal decision for sub-tribes. (see Mitchell, Nationalist Forces I; Islamist and Misrata Forces I & Islamist and Misrata Forces II).
The central government and municipalities have largely failed to provide services to their constituencies, thereby providing fertile soil to terrorist organizations, such as Ansar al-Shari’a (AAS) Benghazi and AAS Darnah, to fill that void and recruit. This confluence of factors has allowed violent extremist elements to use platforms in Libya to conduct short-term training for Libyan and third-country recruits en route to terrorist attack destinations in the region and to Syria. Libya-based violent extremists continued to supply arms throughout the region and to fighters in Syria. Regional terrorist organizations exploited the vulnerabilities of the relatively isolated and ungoverned border regions to the south and west to launch the In Amenas attack in Algeria in January.
Elements and Behavior Over Time (BOT)
At first we broke Libya down into smaller elements. The purpose of that was trying to understand the overall situation in Libya. So Figure 1 shows 20 selected elements. We decided to choose elements based on the importance. After choose the elements we extrapolated leverages (red) and outcomes (green) as presented in the figure 1.
Figure 1.
On the whole the list of elements shows the most important issues in Libya which has effects to U.S. interests. Most of the elements were simplified. Example armed forces is listed as one element though it consist of Libya’s Army, Navy and Air force. In addition some of the elements are listed as individual elements without clear leverage or outcomes. Example Tuaregs can be considered sometimes as a leverage and on the other hand an outcome.
Figure 2 demonstrate the most significant elements as a Behavior Over Time (BOT). The figure presents six selected elements in five year period in the future. We chose these elements because they represent the variety and different aspects of Libya’s situation. It should be taken into account that all trends are subjective because primary sources of information were absent. In the figure the first one is an economy element. It shows weakness and trend seems to continue like that the next five years. Even if Libya manages to get profits of its oil economy will remain unilateral. Second BOT is governance element. Start point is low but trend show downwards. This is because corruption will remain a big problem in governance the following years. Third diagram is refugees. The number of the refugees especially to Europe is big currently and it is expected to even grow in the future. Fourth element is violence. The level of violence is high and it probably stays there in the coming five years. Fifth BOT is Libya’s Stability level. It can be estimated that stability will decrease in the future. At last is terrorists’ safe haven. The level is now high and it will stay on that level without significant change in the five years.
Figure 2.
The main conclusions from these two tools are that Libya is sliding mainly downwards because of weak economy, bad governance, raising number of refugees, high level of violence, worsening stability and very likely terrorists’ safe haven.
The Casual Loop Diagram (CLD): Outcomes and Leverages
In 2011, as threats to the regime loomed ominously, Sayf al Islam al Qadhafi, son to the threatened dictator made an ominous prediction.
”Libya does not have a civil society or political parties. Libya is made up of tribes that know their areas, allies, and people. …If secession or a civil war or a sedition occurs …do you think the Libyans will be able to reach an agreement on how to share oil within a week, a month, or even two or three years? If your answer is yes, then you are mistaken. … My brothers, we are tribes, and we will resort to arms to settle the matter since arms are available to everyone now. Instead of mourning the death of 84 people, we will mourn the death of hundreds of thousands of people. Rivers of blood will run through Libya and you will flee. There will be no oil supplies, the foreign companies, foreigners, and oil companies will leave tomorrow, and the distribution of oil will come to an end…” (Blanchard 2014, 2)”
As he sits in a Tripoli prison awaiting resumption of his trial next year, one can’t help but notice the veracity of his prediction. Not only does this statement now ring prophetic, but it also serves to illuminate the challenge the U.S. and its allies have in weighing action and subsequent consequence.
Figure 3.
The Causal Diagram Figure 3 highlights the various key actors in the Libyan conflict. As might be expected, there is an obvious clash between generally secular forces, most notably forces loyal to the COR appointed Military Chief, General Khalifa Haftar, and those of Islamic extremist. A review of the diagram reveals four key system variables which generally shape of the entire system: moderate Islamists, secular partisans, external foreign powers, local militia and tribal groups. First, it remains to be seen how moderate Islamists will lean in the struggle between extremist elements and the secular partisans. Indeed, efforts to politically reconcile these two groups as embodied by the internationally recognized government, the Council of Representatives and their predecessor the General National Congress is the current focus of UN rapprochement efforts. Second, as Western powers and Egypt react to the emerging extremist footprint and the mass exodus of refugees toward Europe, the extent to which these powers intervene could significantly alter circumstances and potentially challenges the legitimacy of the government they all officially recognize. Finally, as alluded to previously, while becoming increasingly bifurcated over time, the allegiance of tribal groups to Libya Dawn, Operation Dignity, or neither movement is a critical factor in normalizing the security situation across the country.
Future Trends
External and internal forces have shaped Libya’s history and both will continue to interact to shape its future. As has always been the case, Libya’s tribes will play a large role in determining its future as a state. Incorporating these tribes’ interests into a legitimate central government is required to increase stability in the region and leverage Libya’s national capacity as a key producer of hydrocarbons. Externally, regional and global violent extremist organizations have exploited the governance gap left behind when Muammar Gaddafi was overthrown. Additionally, the intervention of legitimate regional and international organizations will play a key role in determining Libya’s future.
Perhaps the most concerning internal trend is the freedom of movement for Libya-based violent extremist organizations (VEOs). Since the monarchy was overthrown and the recent rise and fall of a fundamentalist central government, the election of the Council of Representatives (COR) has yet to produce a functioning governing body. As the illegitimate government holding onto Tripoli continues to resist the legitimacy of the COR in Tobruk, the provision of essential services and protection of critical infrastructure has been left to those local groups able to control territory. Given Libya’s expansive land and the numerous tribes living there, local VEOs have exploited the lack of central governance, leveraging their newfound strength to influence youth and disenfranchised citizens. Absent legitimate government authority, General Haftar’s recent battlefield losses to fundamentalist military forces have further destabilized Western Libya.
Externally, international VEOs (ISIS and Al Qaeda) have also made gains in Libya, but differences in ideology have thus far prevented the alignment of these organizations into a cohesive force. Fruitless United Nations efforts to mediate differences among multiple power brokers are on hold as declining security caused the UN’s early departure and continues to preclude a return. European Union forces continue to assist with security forces training and border security, but do not possess the capacity or mandate to stymie the tide of violence and instability. Neighboring states warily watch Libya’s decline as refugees seek shelter and Libyan-based VEOs conduct regional operations. Libya’s neighbors have recently undergone their own government transformations and external stress on their limited infrastructure and immature institutions has the potential to destabilize further the entire region.
The most likely future in Libya is a stagnant state wherein the population remains fractured along tribal lines and the legitimate government is unable to gain enough strength to provide security and essential services. Local VEOs continue to operate but none becomes dominant over the majority of the country as tribes also resist forming alliances in exchange for their promises of security. International intervention remains uneven and ineffectual due to the perception that Libya is not the main priority in larger efforts to contain the spread of extremist organizations. International military intervention could assist a nascent government in returning stability to the country, but the size and scope of effort required preclude it. Libya’s neighbors increase security on their Libyan borders but do not intervene due to lack of international support and prioritizing their own internal issues. International VEOs and transnational criminal organizations use Libya as a transit route and base in their global scheme of operations. For additional visual information on Future Trends, see Figures 4-6.
Figure 4.
Figure 5.
Figure 6.
Alternate Futures
An alternative future in Libya is the development of a bifurcated society that leads to civil war. The illegitimate, fundamentalist government in Tripoli remains unwilling to compromise with the legitimate government in Tobruk that has formed but proven unable to integrate Islamic fundamentalists in a successful manner. In this scenario, lack of international military intervention forces tribes to align with other tribes to resist increasingly powerful forces attempting to diminish their territorial dominion. Stronger international VEOs achieve greater alignment, sharing labor and resources with coopted tribes and local VEOs to form one front. Opposed to these VEOs, Gen Haftar is able to align a number of local tribes and moderate support from external sources. Armed conflict escalates with a significant increase in IDPs, refugees, casualties, and mass atrocities. Due to the increasing level of conflict, international organizations and NGOs are unable to address further reduction of essential services provisions and the flow of IDPs and refugees escalates dramatically. For additional visual information on Alternative Futures, see Figures 5 and 7.
Figure 7.
Social Change Theory
When applying Bishop and Hines social change theory to Libya, certain theories are relevant to the Libya complex problem set. (Bishop, 1) The United States is firmly rooted in Progress Theory as the social change theory with the most explanatory power of why today’s societies are better than those of the past and will get better over time. The U.S. views Globalization as the natural result of Progress Theory. This rationale is based on the belief that Progress Theory lends itself to globalization, thereby expanding Western culture and values. We maintain the social change theory with the most explanatory power with regard to the situation in Libya is Culture Theory. In Libya, as in most Middle Eastern societies, individual and social identity is rooted in history and culture. If this holds true, Libya will only accept globalization if it placates the people without changing their culture. One Libyan social issue is the friction between Cultural theory and Conflict theory as multiple stakeholders see conflict as a means to solidify their culture theory across Libya as an instrument of social change. The inequity that permeates Libya and which is influenced by outside stakeholders results in the rise in dominance of conflict theory’s role in complex group dynamics within Libya. The United States should be cautious in formulating military solutions to the Libya problem set as a military-only strategy of either direct action or proxy action through Train/Equip (TE) could result in further conflict rather than creating consensus and the protection of culture over conflict.
Anticipatory Management Diagram Analysis
The NIC 2030 Alternative Futures modeling offers the external and internal issues needing to be assessed to provide insights for understanding the Libya problem. (NIC, ii). The issues assessed were proposed individually, then discussed to identify key issues worth pursuing and issues to monitor as options were developed over time. Applying Molitor’s model of change that will frame, advance, and resolve these agreed upon issues can lead to innovation in policy, process, or action. (Molitor, 61-68). The external issues requiring further study are: 1) demographic patterns as they relate to urbanization, migration and population growth in Libya and the region; 2) Governance gaps emphasizing how governments and institutions tend to be overwhelmed by change; and 3) Wider view of regional instability in the Middle East. Internal issues are: 1) Understanding the environment to inform policy makers who frequently fail to recognize, acknowledge or properly define the operational environment; 2) Battle for the narrative that lacks a recognition of the importance of information and linking narrative to desires; 3) Lack of Interagency coordination in planning, operations, policy, resourcing, and cultural understanding; and 4) Host nation partnering applied to the proper resourcing and prioritization of assets in and around Libya to create enablers and force multipliers in the stabilization process. Simply stated, a more complete analysis and understanding of these issues may result in better cultural or process understanding lending itself to a shift in policy or resource application that leads to positive change in Libya. (See Figure 8 for a breakout of the Anticipatory Management Diagram).
Figure 8.
Strategic Recommendations
Within the Libya system, far and above, the most critical effort must be to advance rapprochement efforts between moderate Islamists and secular partisans for control of legislative authority. Libya is somewhat unique in that neither rival faction has the wherewithal to adequately govern. Moderate Islamists members, while wielding significant cultural clout, lack legitimacy in the eyes of critical Western powers or control of Libyan conventional military force. Conversely, “legitimate” secular partisans are unable to even convene in the capital city or exercise authority over significant segments of the bureaucracy, such as the central bank. Absent both legitimacy and authority to govern, well-meaning support efforts are prone to being misdirected and ineffective.
Avoid inclination towards a train and equip strategy. Often the knee-jerk reaction to failing states and poor governance, western powers often seek to build “partner capacity.” At the moment, however, there is not a reliable partner with which to cooperate. Additionally, capacity, especially in the area of security is not the Libyan shortfall–weapons and sufficiently trained soldiers abound. Rather, a successful strategy must focus on incentivizing reconciliation among rival but rational actors while simultaneously isolating extremist groups.
There is likely both a high-end option and a low military intervention approach to this issue but both must address the political reconciliation process and the security challenges. On the high-end, the UN might deploy a peace-keeping force to protect key infrastructure (such as the Tripoli airport and energy resources), provide resources to displaced persons, and prevent Islamist Extremist actions from undermining the rapprochement process. On the low intervention end, Western and African powers serve as a broker for reconciliation leveraging offers of security cooperation to an inclusive, representative government as well as ultimately recognition and legitimacy. Naturally, foreign powers must weigh intervention against risk of delegitimizing government elements; however, for the West and other regional powers the flow of refugees and the emergence of the Islamic State may eventually present threats meriting direct action.
